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The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the free exercise of 
religion. Non-religious practices do not receive those same protections, which makes the 
ability to distinguish between religious and non-religious practices important. Regrettably, 
members of the Court have been unable to agree about how to distinguish the religious 
from the non-religious—sometimes, the implicit criteria focus on the sincerity of the be-
liefs, sometimes the strength of the beliefs or the role that they play in an individual’s life, 
and sometimes the kind of beliefs. What qualifies as religious under one of these criteria 
might not qualify as religious under another, which means that whether particular practices 
will be protected under free exercise guarantees may depend upon which of these criteria 
are used or emphasized. 
The Court has repeatedly stated that free exercise guarantees do not protect non-
religious practices but has nonetheless refused to state the criteria in light of which the 
religious can be distinguished from the non-religious. To make matters even more confus-
ing, the Court has sometimes suggested that it is beyond the competence of courts in al-
most all cases to determine what qualifies as religious. In short, the Court has virtually 
guaranteed an incoherent jurisprudence by sending contradictory signals with respect to 
one of the most basic questions in free exercise jurisprudence—what counts as religion.1 
This Article traces the Court’s wavering approaches to free exercise guarantees, not-
ing some of the areas in which the Court continues to send mixed messages—the Court 
has both affirmed and rejected that religious practices are afforded special protection under 
free exercise guarantees and has been utterly inconsistent with respect to whether courts 
can decide which beliefs qualify as religious or what criteria would be appropriate to make 
such a determination. While some of the Court’s articulated positions are simply impossi-
ble to reconcile, the Article nonetheless concludes that many of the Court’s seemingly 
inconsistent assertions are reconcilable, although in a way that doubtless will leave all 
parties in the Culture Wars somewhat dissatisfied. 
Part II of this Article discusses the Court’s developing jurisprudence regarding what 
                                                          
 *  Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio 
 1. But see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to 
Religious Doctrine: Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 807, 833-34 (2009) (“We want 
to cast doubt on the common assumption which holds that to interpret the Constitution’s Religion Clauses one 
must define what religion is, and that it is therefore something of an embarrassment that this fundamental question 
has gone unanswered in American constitutional jurisprudence.”). 
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counts as religion for free exercise purposes, noting some of the Court’s contradictory 
messages with respect to how this matter should be resolved.2 Part III discusses some of 
the competing interpretations of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding which beliefs and 
practices qualify, explaining why many commentators’ interpretations are too restrictive.3 
The Article concludes that the Court’s expansive definition of religion for free exercise 
purposes will likely be cause for celebration (and sorrow) for both sides of the Culture 
Wars.4 Traditionalists will be pleased (and some non-traditionalists displeased) because 
the Free Exercise Clause does indeed privilege religion over non-religion, while non-tra-
ditionalists will be pleased (and some traditionalists displeased) because the guarantees 
may be triggered by the burdening of beliefs and practices that would never count as reli-
gion as conventionally understood. 
II. THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
The Court’s approach of free exercise guarantees has been inconsistent in a number 
of areas, making free exercise jurisprudence murky if not incomprehensible.5 Further, the 
Court’s lack of clarity with respect to these issues has been surprisingly persistent. The 
Court has emphasized some indicia in certain cases and other indicia in other cases without 
making clear how the factors relate. Employment Division v. Smith6 may have involved an 
attempt by the Court to extricate itself from some of the difficulties that its own jurispru-
dence had created, although that case did not clarify what counts as religion but simply 
made resolution of that issue less important in many cases.7 The Court has offered very 
broad outlines of what counts as religion, making that category much more inclusive than 
many seem to appreciate. 
A.  Setting the Stage 
Over one hundred and forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court suggested 
that free exercise rights have robust protection. In Watson v. Jones, the Court explained 
that “the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious prin-
ciple, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and 
property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.”8 Here, the Court 
seemed to be offering a ringing endorsement of robust free exercise guarantees, although 
the strength and breadth of those protections depended upon how broadly the exceptions 
                                                          
 2. See infra pp. 102-32. 
 3. See infra pp. 132-37. 
 4. See infra pp. 137-39. 
 5. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564 (1993) (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“we are left with a free-exercise jurisprudence in tension 
with itself”); Christopher N. Elliott, Federalism and Religious Liberty: Were Church and State Meant to Be 
Separate?, 2 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 5 (2000) (discussing “the United States Supreme Court’s establishment 
and free exercise cases, which are frequently logically incomprehensible”); Timothy J. Santoli, A Decade After 
Employment Division v. Smith: Examining How Courts Are Still Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights Exception 
to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 649, 672 (2001) (“The Supreme 
Court of the United States . . . confused federal courts and instilled unpredictability in free exercise jurispru-
dence”). 
 6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 7. See infra notes 317-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of Smith. 
 8. 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871). 
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss1/1
448C3990 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/10/2015  12:36 PM 
2015] DEFINITIONS, RELIGION, AND FREE EXERCISE GUARANTEES 3 
 
involving morality, property, and personal rights were construed.9 If the state could pro-
hibit any religious practice thought to contravene conventional morality and if it were be-
lieved immoral to ingest alcoholic beverages, for example, then it would seem that com-
munion could be prohibited without offending constitutional guarantees.10 
In Reynolds v. United States,11 the Court examined the degree to which free exercise 
rights were protected, at least with respect to whether the Constitution afforded protection 
to polygamy. The Court noted that “[r]eligious freedom is guaranteed everywhere through-
out the United States, so far as congressional interference is concerned,”12 because of the 
First Amendment restriction stating that “Congress shall pass no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”13 But the question at hand 
was, “[W]hat is the religious freedom which has been guaranteed[?]”14 
When discussing the First Amendment’s free exercise guarantees, the Court distin-
guished between belief and practice in a way that would be repeated in the subsequent case 
law.15 “Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with 
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”16 Thus, religious beliefs as 
such are immune from regulation, although the same cannot be said of religious practices. 
The Court offered some illustrations of why free exercise rights cannot be thought abso-
lute. “Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious wor-
ship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could 
not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”17 By the same token, “if a wife religiously believed 
it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be 
beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into prac-
tice?”18 It soon became clear, however, that free exercise guarantees are limited even when 
                                                          
 9. Cf. Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915, 918 (1992) (discussing “a willingness to allow government to deny the otherwise 
guaranteed religious liberty to persons whose religious beliefs or actions threatened the capacity of civil society 
to fulfill its functions . . . [the requirement that persons] avoid disturbing the ‘good order,’ ‘safety,’ or ‘happiness’ 
of society or of the state appears to have demanded a greater degree of obedience than just peaceful behavior”). 
 10. Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 913 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“During Prohibition, the Federal Government 
exempted such use of wine from its general ban on possession and use of alcohol. See National Prohibition Act, 
Title II, § 3, 41 Stat. 308. However compelling the Government’s then general interest in prohibiting the use of 
alcohol may have been, it could not plausibly have asserted an interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh Cath-
olics’ right to take communion.”). 
 11. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 12. Id. at 162. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162 (“Congress cannot pass a law for the government 
of the Territories which shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. The first amendment to the Constitution ex-
pressly forbids such legislation.”). 
 14. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162. 
 15. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (“‘Laws,’ we said, ‘are made for the government of actions, and while 
they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices’”) (citing Reynolds, 98 
U.S. at 166); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (“the Amendment embraces two concepts, 
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. 
Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society”) (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145); United States 
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts, freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be”) (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 
303, 304). 
 16. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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human lives do not hang in the balance. 
The Reynolds Court noted that Congress has the power to prohibit polygamy in fed-
eral territories as a general matter,19 and then examined whether an exception had to be 
recognized for those whose practice of polygamy involved a religious exercise.20 Contrary 
to the Watson opinion issued just seven years earlier suggesting that the Constitution’s free 
exercise guarantees are robust,21 the Reynolds opinion suggested that religious practices 
do not receive special protection from the Constitution. Any other view would allegedly 
have anomalous implications, because those in plural marriages “who do not make polyg-
amy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, 
must be acquitted and go free.”22 The law “provided that plural marriages shall not be 
allowed,”23 and the Court feared that permitting individuals to be immune from the oper-
ation of that law because of their religious belief “would be to make the professed doctrines 
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to 
become a law unto himself.”24 
The Court’s fear that protecting religious exercise would make each citizen a law 
unto himself or herself25 was unwarranted for a few different reasons.26 First, the individ-
ual might be required to establish the sincerity of the religious belief at issue before an 
exemption could be afforded. Many individuals would have much difficulty in establishing 
that their sincere religious beliefs require that they be exempted from a variety of laws,27 
so the worry that recognition of free exercise rights would invite anarchy is overstated. 
Second, the importance of the implicated state interest would determine whether even sin-
cere religious practices could be prohibited—the state’s interest in the preservation of hu-
man life presumably justifies the prevention of human sacrifice (by self or other), sincere 
religious beliefs notwithstanding. Third, the Court might try to limit which “religious” 
beliefs and practices counted for purposes of federal constitutional guarantees, although 
such an approach has its own problems.28 
                                                          
 19. Id. (“In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Con-
gress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in 
places over which the United States have exclusive control.”). 
 20. Id. (“[T]he only question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are 
excepted from the operation of the statute.”). 
 21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 22. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 167. 
 25. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Religion, Equality, and Public Reason, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1321, 1327 (2014) 
(discussing the “anarchy objection, which is that no society can tolerate individuals deciding for themselves, on 
the basis of their religious or secular consciences, which laws they will follow and which are morally objection-
able”). 
 26. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 218 (1992) (dis-
cussing the “overstated fear of religious anarchy”). 
 27. See Robert N. Anderson, Just Say No to Judicial Review: The Impact of Oregon v. Smith on the Free 
Exercise Clause, 76 IOWA L. REV. 805, 824 (1991) (“The sincerity test alone sufficiently prevents unwarranted 
religious exemptions”); David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1035 (2002) (“In 
the religion context, such anarchy concerns were in part assuaged by the sincerity requirement. While the truth 
or falsity of religious beliefs is deemed outside the province of government, whether a person was sincerely 
motivated to engage in conduct for religious reasons is an allowable inquiry”); Bradley P. Jacob, Free Exercise 
in the “Lobbying Nineties,” 84 NEB. L. REV. 795, 802 (2006) (“the government always has the option of attempt-
ing to prove that the claimed religious belief is a sham”). 
 28. See infra notes 353-410 and accompanying text (discussing differing proposals regarding the best way to 
4
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There is some difficulty in interpreting Reynolds, precisely because the Court did 
not rest its upholding the polygamy ban on the alleged great dangers of polygamy. That is 
not to say that the Court treated the “odious”29 practice of polygamy lightly, having men-
tioned that the punishment for it in England was death.30 Nonetheless, if it is anomalous 
to punish certain lawbreakers but to refrain from punishing other lawbreakers who have 
religious compunctions about following the law at issue, then that anomalousness is also 
present in cases involving religious prohibitions or requirements with respect to matters 
other than polygamy. 
In Davis v. Beason,31 the Court explained its view of the dangers of bigamy and 
polygamy, which “tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace 
of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man.”32 The practice of polygamy was con-
demned in no uncertain terms, because “[f]ew crimes are more pernicious to the best in-
terests of society, and receive more general or more deserved punishment.”33 Affording 
an exemption to those who committed polygamy out of religious belief would “shock the 
moral judgment of the community.”34 The danger posed by polygamy was allegedly so 
great that the Davis Court seemed to reject the belief/action dichotomy discussed in Reyn-
olds a little over a decade earlier, explaining that calling “advocacy [of polygamy] a tenet 
of religion [and thus protected] is to offend the common sense of mankind.”35 
Here, the Court’s meaning was not immediately clear. The Davis Court might have 
been suggesting that because engaging in polygamy was a crime, advocating that individ-
uals enter into polygamous relationships was also a crime. “If they [bigamy and polygamy] 
are crimes, then to teach, advise, and counsel their practice is to aid in their commission, 
and such teaching and counseling are themselves criminal, and proper subjects of punish-
ment, as aiding and abetting crime are in all other cases.”36 If teaching religious doctrine 
counts as an act rather than a belief (and thus is subject to prohibition), then the belief/act 
distinction has either been rejected or at least modified in an important way. The Reynolds 
Court suggested that the Constitution protects the belief that polygamy is appropriate (at 
least for certain people37) or that God approves of polygamy as long as one does not act 
on that belief, for example, enter into a polygamous relationship; whereas the Davis Court 
suggested either that the belief/action distinction is not viable or that the prohibited activity 
includes not only entering into a polygamous relationship but also teaching that polygamy 
is viewed positively by one’s religion. 
                                                          
distinguish between religion and non-religion). 
 29. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of 
Europe.”). 
 30. See id. at 165 (“the offence, if committed in England or Wales, was made punishable in the civil courts, 
and the penalty was death”). 
 31. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 32. Id. at 341. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 342. 
 36. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342. 
 37. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878) (“it was an accepted doctrine of that church ‘that 
it was the duty of male members of said church, circumstances permitting, to practise polygamy”). 
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A different explanation of why advocacy of polygamy could not be considered a 
religious tenet was that the Court (may have) rejected that the Church of Latter Day Saints 
was really a religion. The Court explained that the “term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s 
views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for 
his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”38 However, the Court noted that the 
term “religion” is sometimes “confounded with the cultus or form of worship of a partic-
ular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.”39 Here, the Davis Court seemed to be 
suggesting that polygamy is not entitled to free exercise protection because it does not 
count as a religious exercise.40 
Basically, the Court offered two explanations for its rejection of protection for po-
lygamy, one suggesting that polygamy did not even count as a religious practice and the 
other suggesting that polygamy was not protected even if it was a religious practice. The 
First Amendment permits everyone to “entertain such notions respecting his relations to 
his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and con-
science.”41 In addition, the amendment permits each person “to exhibit his sentiments in 
such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others.”42 
However, that amendment “was never intended [to] . . . be invoked as a protection against 
legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of 
society.”43 The Court believed that a good indicator of what was inimical to the good order 
of society was whether a particular practice had been criminalized, and “[h]owever free 
the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country, 
passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subjects of 
punitive legislation.”44 
Suppose that a particular sect believed that individuals should have sexual relations 
outside of marriage, perhaps because the sect did not believe in marriage.45 Would such 
individuals be immune from prosecution under fornication statutes?46 The Davis Court 
explained that should such a sect “find its way into this country, swift punishment would 
follow the carrying into effect of its doctrines, and no heed would be given to the pretense 
                                                          
 38. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Cf. Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions 
Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 738 (2001) 
(“[I]n Davis v. Beason, . . . Mormonism was defined as a “cultus”); Ashby D. Boyle II, Fear and Trembling at 
the Court: Dimensions of Understanding in the Supreme Court’s Religion Jurisprudence, 3 SETON HALL CONST. 
L.J. 55, 67-68 (1993) (“In Davis v. Beason, the Court undertook to determine the meaning of ‘religion.’ It held 
that the Mormon Church fell outside of the Court’s definition of religion, and therefore, the constitutional lan-
guage that guarantees the free exercise of religion was deemed an irrelevant application to the case.”). 
 41. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 342-43. 
 45. Id. at 343 (“There have been sects which denied as a part of their religious tenets that there should be any 
marriage tie, and advocated promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, as prompted by the passions of its members.”). 
 46. The Court did not suggest that fornication was constitutionally protected until Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003). See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 370 (Va. 2005) (holding that the Virginia fornication 
statute violates due process guarantees in light of Lawrence). 
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that, as religious beliefs, their supporters could be protected in their exercise by the con-
stitution of the United States.”47 Again, the Davis Court seemed to be offering two differ-
ing rationales, one focusing on religious practices that might be thought immoral and the 
other focusing on practices that should not be considered religious. Because practices in-
volving sexual relations between unmarried parties were “recognized by the general con-
sent of the Christian world in modern times as proper matters for prohibitory legisla-
tion,”48 the Court rejected that the “punitive power of the government for [such] acts . . . 
must be suspended in order that the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may be 
carried out without hindrance.”49 Thus, the Court suggested, such religious practices can-
not be permitted because they are contrary to societal welfare. Yet, by talking about the 
pretense that non-marital relations must be protected based on religious beliefs, the Court 
might instead have been suggesting that such beliefs and practices do not count as reli-
gious. 
The Davis Court offered ambiguous rationales in other parts of the opinion as well. 
“Whilst legislation for the establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise 
permitted, it does not follow that everything which may be so called can be tolerated. 
Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate 
as ‘religion.’”50 Here, too, the Court offers two different rationales, one suggesting that 
merely because certain views are called or designated as religious does not make them so 
and the other suggesting that even if particular practices are religious, they may nonethe-
less be odious and subject to punishment. 
Perhaps there was no need to choose between the two rationales, because a practice, 
e.g., human sacrifice, might be sufficiently pernicious that it could be regulated whether 
or not religiously required. Nonetheless, there were clear costs associated with the Court’s 
failure to make clear what it was arguing. If indeed the practices described did not count 
as religious, then there was no need to undermine the strength of free exercise protections 
because they had not even been triggered. If these practices did count as religious but were 
so odious that they could not be countenanced notwithstanding their triggering free exer-
cise guarantees, then there was no need to suggest that criminal laws as a general matter 
could be enforced against those practicing their religion. Instead, such enforcement might 
be appropriate when compelling state interests were at stake but not, for example, when 
merely legitimate but not compelling state interests were implicated. 
One additional aspect of Davis is worthy of note. The Idaho statute at issue specified 
that no person 
 
who is a member of any order, organization, or association which 
teaches, advises, counsels, or encourages its members or devotees, or 
any other persons, to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any 
other crime defined by law, either as a rite or ceremony of such order, 
                                                          
 47. Davis, 133 U.S. at 343. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 345. 
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organization, or association, or otherwise, is permitted to vote at any 
election, or to hold any position or office of honor, trust, or profit within 
this Territory.51 
 
The Davis Court believed this provision “not open to any constitutional or legal ob-
jection,”52 even though application of the statute might result in an individual’s losing the 
right to vote just by being a member of the Church. Such a person might be prevented from 
voting, even if that individual was not in addition someone who “teaches, advises, coun-
sels, or encourages any person or persons to become bigamists or polygamists, or to com-
mit any other crime defined by law, or to enter into what is known as plural or celestial 
marriage.”53 
When discussing Davis, the Court in Romer v. Evans suggested that an individual 
could not be denied the vote merely because the person advocated polygamy,54 and noted 
in addition that Davis’s willingness to deny the vote merely because of group membership 
would also be unlikely to survive constitutional review.55 Davis’s apparent rejection of the 
belief/action distinction was addressed in a subsequent case, Cantwell v. Connecticut.56 
B.  Modern Free Exercise 
Cantwell is important for a number of reasons, not least of which was that the Court 
held that the free exercise guarantees of the First Amendment were incorporated through 
the Fourteenth Amendment against the states.57 The case involved a challenge to the con-
victions of the Cantwells—Newton, Jesse, and Russell—for soliciting funds without the 
required certificate58 and for breach of the peace.59 The Cantwells were Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses60 who went from house to house attempting to distribute religious pamphlets and 
books in exchange for donations.61 
The Cantwell Court explained: “Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to 
such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be 
                                                          
 51. Id. at 347. 
 52. Davis, 133 U.S. at 347. 
 53. Id. at 346-47. 
 54. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“To the extent Davis held that persons advocating a certain 
practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no longer good law.”) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969)). 
 55. Id. (“To the extent it held that the groups designated in the statute may be deprived of the right to vote 
because of their status, its ruling could not stand without surviving strict scrutiny, a most doubtful outcome.”) 
(citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972)). 
 56. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
 57. Id. at 303 (“We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their 
liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept of 
liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. The First 
Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws.”). 
 58. See id. at 300-02. 
 59. See id. at 300. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 301. 
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restricted by law.”62 The Constitution “safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of 
religion.”63 Echoing a distinction offered in Reynolds, the Court distinguished between the 
“freedom to believe and [the] freedom to act.”64 The freedom to believe is “absolute,”65 
although “[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.”66 As sup-
port for the proposition that the state can reach religious conduct, the Court cited both 
Reynolds and Davis,67 although the Court nowhere intimated that the Reynolds and Davis 
Courts disagreed even implicitly68 about whether the action/belief distinction was good 
law. 
When suggesting that the state can regulate religious activity under certain condi-
tions, the Cantwell Court nonetheless warned that the fact that the activity was religious 
was important—“the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permis-
sible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”69 One of the questions at hand in-
volved who had the power to determine whether the activity in question was religious. The 
Connecticut statute read: 
 
No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable 
thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from 
other than a member of the organization for whose benefit such person 
is soliciting or within the county in which such person or organization 
is located unless such cause shall have been approved by the secretary 
of the public welfare council.70 
 
The Cantwell Court reasoned that the Connecticut law “requires an application to 
the secretary of the public welfare council of the State; . . . he is empowered to determine 
whether the cause is a religious one, and . . . the issue of a certificate depends upon his 
affirmative action.”71 If the secretary found that the cause was not religious, then solicita-
tion for it would be a crime,72 which might adversely impact the ability of the group to 
survive.73 But “to condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views 
or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by 
state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 303. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. 
 67. See id. at 304 n.4 
 68. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text for discussion of the Davis Court’s treatment of the be-
lief/action distinction. 
 69. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. 
 70. Id. at 301-02. 
 71. Id. at 305. 
 72. Id. (“If he finds that the cause is not that of religion, to solicit for it becomes a crime.”). 
 73. Id. (“He is authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is not a religious one. Such 
a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the 
First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth.”). 
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of liberty protected by the Constitution.”74 
The state interest supporting the legislation was the prevention of fraud.75 While not 
“intend[ing] even remotely to imply that, under the cloak of religion, persons may, with 
impunity, commit frauds upon the public,”76 the Court nonetheless suggested that the fate 
of a religion could not be based on a state official’s “appraisal of facts, . . . exercise of 
judgment, and . . . formation of an opinion”77 with respect to whether certain beliefs con-
stituted a religion. 
It is simply unclear whether the Cantwell Court was suggesting that state officials 
as a general matter must refrain from deciding which groups are religious. If so, then state 
courts would have much difficulty in rejecting that a group’s claimed religious beliefs 
were in fact religious, although courts might still determine whether the beliefs in question 
were sincerely held.78 
Assuming that the Constitution permits courts to distinguish between religious and 
non-religious beliefs, an important issue involves the appropriate criterion for making that 
determination.79 The Court has repeatedly admitted the difficulty posed in distinguishing 
between the religious and non-religious,80 has provided no clear criteria in light of which 
such a determination should be made,81 but nonetheless continues to assert that the dis-
tinction is of constitutional consequence.82 
C.  Echoes of Nineteenth Century Ambivalence? 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania83 illustrated that the Court’s ambivalence in the nineteenth 
century about whether to treat polygamy as a religious practice continued into the twenti-
eth century. At issue in Murdock was whether Jehovah’s Witnesses could be forced to buy 
a license to sell religious literature.84 The issue presented differed from what had been 
                                                          
 74. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307. 
 75. Id. at 304 (“The State insists that the Act . . . merely safeguards against the perpetration of frauds under 
the cloak of religion.”). 
 76. Id. at 306. 
 77. Id. at 305. 
 78. See infra notes 101-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ballard. 
 79. See infra notes 353-410 and accompanying text for a discussion of different possible criteria. 
 80. See Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (“Nor do we underestimate the difficulty 
of distinguishing between religious and secular convictions.”); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
714 (1981) (“The determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and 
delicate task.”). 
 81. See Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55, 68 (2006) 
(“[N]o attempt to define religion has won sufficiently wide support to be accepted as providing the answer to this 
problem.”). 
 82. Cf. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833 (“There is no doubt that ‘[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause.’”) (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713); see also Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833 (“Purely secular 
views do not suffice.”) (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
215-16 (1972). 
 83. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
 84. Id. at 106 (“That all persons canvassing for or soliciting within said Borough, orders for goods, paintings, 
pictures, wares, or merchandise of any kind, or persons delivering such articles under orders so obtained or so-
licited, shall be required to procure from the Burgess a license to transact said business and shall pay to the 
Treasurer of said Borough therefore the following sums according to the time for which said license shall be 
granted. For one day $1.50, for one week seven dollars ($7.00), for two weeks twelve dollars ($12.00), for three 
weeks twenty dollars ($20.00), provided that the provisions of this ordinance shall not apply to persons selling 
by sample to manufacturers or licensed merchants or dealers doing business in said Borough of Jeannette.”). 
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decided in Cantwell, because the state official was not trying to determine which groups 
were religious.85 Nonetheless, this state law would impose a financial burden on poor 
groups seeking to distribute their religious tracts.86 The petitioners had not purchased a 
license,87 and had nonetheless gone door-to-door distributing religious literature and ask-
ing for donations.88 
When evaluating the constitutionality of the ordinance, the Court noted that the 
“hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism—as old 
as the history of printing presses.”89 Distribution of religious tracts by hand involved a 
combination of preaching and of distributing religious literature,90 and thus “occup[ied] 
the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preach-
ing from the pulpits, [which meant that it had] . . . the same claim to protection as the more 
orthodox and conventional exercises of religion.”91 The Court had no difficulty in classi-
fying the Witnesses’ activity as religious and entitled to First Amendment protection, ech-
oing one of the worries articulated in Cantwell, namely, that the state must not be permitted 
to prevent poor religious groups from engaging in free exercise.92 Were the tax upheld, 
then “[s]preading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner would . . . be de-
nied the needy.”93 
Lest its meaning be misunderstood, the Court expressly rejected that “any conduct 
can be made a religious rite and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First Amend-
ment.”94 The Court explained that Reynolds and Davis “denied any such claim to the prac-
tice of polygamy and bigamy.”95 Presumably, this meant that polygamy did not even fall 
under the First Amendment (i.e., could not be swept into that amendment),96 although the 
Court might merely have been suggesting that such practices, even if religious, would not 
be protected under the First Amendment. Thus, when noting that “[o]ther claims may well 
arise which deserve the same fate,”97 the Court did not explain whether those envisioned 
practices would not even trigger First Amendment analysis or whether, instead, the First 
Amendment analysis would be applied but would be unavailing to save the practice. The 
Murdock Court clearly envisioned that some types of religious conduct could be regulated, 
noting that the way in which certain evangelistic actions are “practiced at times gives rise 
                                                          
 85. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. 
 86. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113 (“[T]he license tax . . . is not a nominal fee.”). 
 87. Id. at 107 (“None of them obtained a license under the ordinance.”). 
 88. Id. (“Before they were arrested each had made ‘sales’ of books.”). 
 89. Id. at 108. 
 90. Id. at 109 (“It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination 
of both.”). 
 91. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113. 
 92. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (The secretary of the public welfare council “is 
authorized to withhold his approval if he determines that the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of 
religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment 
and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth.”). 
 93. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 112. 
 94. Id. at 109 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161 (1878)). 
 95. Id. at 110. 
 96. Id. at 109 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161). 
 97. Id. at 110. 
11
Strasser: Definitions, Religion, and Free Exercise Guarantees
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
12 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
 
to special problems with which the police power of the states is competent to deal.”98 
That certain practices might fall within the First Amendment but be subject to regu-
lation “merely illustrates that the rights with which [the Court had been] . . . dealing are 
not absolutes.”99 Thus, as had been true in previous cases, the Murdock Court’s analysis 
was ambiguous with respect to whether there were some unspecified criteria by which to 
determine which practices were religious or whether, instead, the Court was only suggest-
ing that certain religious practices are not protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 
D.  The Court Refuses to Classify Beliefs as Non-Religious 
In United States v. Ballard,100 the Court had a golden opportunity101 to illustrate 
that certain beliefs do not qualify as religious, even if the Court was unprepared at that 
time to offer the criteria in light of which such decisions should be made. At issue were 
the claims of those in the “I Am” movement. One of the beliefs of those in the movement 
was that certain individuals “had, by reason of supernatural attainments, the power to heal 
persons of ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted with any diseases, 
injuries, or ailments.”102 These “designated persons had the ability and power to cure per-
sons of those diseases normally classified as curable and also of diseases which are ordi-
narily classified by the medical profession as being incurable diseases.”103 Not only did 
these individuals claim to have such powers, but they claimed to have exercised them. 
Allegedly, “the three designated persons had in fact cured . . . hundreds of persons afflicted 
with diseases and ailments.”104 The Ballards publicly represented that they had these pow-
ers, and members of the public would send money,105 presumably in the hopes that the 
power to cure the incurable would be used.106 The Ballards were charged with fraud.107 
A fraud conviction requires that false representations have been made.108 However, 
the Ballard Court explained that courts cannot judge which religious beliefs are true and 
which false.109 The First Amendment “embraces the right to maintain theories of life and 
of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the orthodox faiths.”110 
The Founders had been aware of the varied religious views that people might have,111 and 
                                                          
 98. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 110 (citing Cox v. New Hampshire 312 U.S. 569 (1941) and Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)). 
 99. Id. (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 161 (1938)). 
 100. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 101. Cf. id. at 92 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I can see in their teachings nothing but humbug, untainted by any 
trace of truth.”). 
 102. Id. at 80. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 82 (noting that the Ballards “used the mail for the purpose of getting money”). 
 106. Charles W. Collier, Terrorism As an Intellectual Problem, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 815, 824 (2007) (“On the 
basis of their extensive contacts in the afterworld and their stellar qualifications as “ascended masters,” the Bal-
lards offered to heal those afflicted with otherwise incurable diseases and solicited money for that purpose.”). 
 107. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 83 (discussing “the scheme to defraud alleged in the indictment”). 
 108. See id. (discussing “the eighteen alleged false representations”). 
 109. Id. at 86 (“[W]e do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents’ religious doctrines or beliefs should 
have been submitted to the jury. Whatever this particular indictment might require, the First Amendment pre-
cludes such a course.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 87 (“The Fathers of the Constitution were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of religious 
12
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“[t]hey fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the widest possible toleration 
of conflicting views.”112 While “[t]he religious views espoused by respondents [the Bal-
lards] might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people,”113 the Court reasoned 
that “if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or 
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.”114 
Chief Justice Stone dissented, denying that “the constitutional guaranty of freedom 
of religion affords immunity from criminal prosecution for the fraudulent procurement of 
money by false statements as to one’s religious experiences, more than it renders polyg-
amy or libel immune from criminal prosecution.”115 For example, if the individuals had 
claimed to have cured hundreds of people, then it was open to the government to try to 
show that no people had ever been cured.116 
Perhaps the claims of effecting cures could have been shown to be false, for exam-
ple, if the Ballards had claimed to have gone to San Francisco and cured hundreds and it 
could be shown that the Ballards had never even visited California.117 Of course, fraud 
would have been more difficult to establish if particular individuals believed themselves 
to have been cured after having had contact with one of the Ballards.118 
The approach adopted by the Ballard Court is important, a least in part, because of 
its refusal to classify the contested beliefs as non-religious. While sympathetic to the Cant-
well Court’s denial that “under the cloak of religion, persons may, with impunity, commit 
frauds upon the public,”119 the Ballard Court nonetheless held that the Constitution pre-
cludes the trier of fact from finding that certain beliefs were “cloaked”120 as religious, i.e., 
were not really religious. The Court was silent as to how a fraud conviction could with-
stand constitutional review if an essential element of the crime involved the falsity of re-
ligious beliefs. 
As a general matter, an individual can be convicted of fraud only if he made an 
intentional misrepresentation of a fact or state of affairs with the purpose of inducing some-
one to surrender something of value.121 For example, an individual might induce someone 
                                                          
sects, of the violence of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which all men 
would agree.”). 
 112. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.; cf. Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969) (“First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to 
turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”). 
 115. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 88-89 (Stone, C.J. dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 89 (Stone, C.J. dissenting) (“[I]t would be open to the Government to submit to the jury proof 
that . . . no such cures had ever been effected.”). 
 117. See id. (Stone, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t would be open to the Government to submit to the jury proof that 
he had never been in San Francisco”). 
 118.  Cf. Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Patients, Parents, and 
Healers, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 606 (1993) (“The assertion that religious practices may directly ben-
efit mental or physical health is more likely to engender debate.”). 
 119. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See In re E.P., 185 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Tex. App. 2006) (“Fraud is defined as ‘trickery or deceit,’ ‘inten-
tional misrepresentation, concealment, or nondisclosure for the purpose of inducing another in reliance upon it 
to part with some valuable thing belonging to him,’ or ‘a false representation of a matter of fact by words or 
conduct . . . or by the concealment of what should have been disclosed that deceives or is intended to deceive 
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to give him money for a particular charitable purpose but then might use the money for his 
own enrichment as he had intended all along.122 But the jury trying the Ballards was pre-
cluded from evaluating the truth or falsity of the Ballards’ underlying religious beliefs,123 
which might be taken to mean that the jury was precluded from finding that there had been 
a false statement regarding the Ballards’ power to effect cures.124 
Suppose that the Ballards in fact had the power to cure people but, unfortunately, 
were unaware that they indeed had that power. Their claims to having the power would be 
insincere (because they did not believe that they had such a power), but ex hypothesi, the 
underlying representation of their power would have been true rather than false. It is not 
fraud to insincerely assert the truth. 
After affirming the trial court’s jury instructions directing jury members to assess 
the Ballards’ sincerity but not the underlying truth or falsity of the religious beliefs,125 the 
Court remanded the case to the circuit court to address some remaining issues.126 On re-
mand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.127 That decision was appealed and the 
Supreme Court reversed, because of the “intentional and systematic exclusion of 
women”128 from the jury pool.129 That exclusion was contrary to California law,130 which 
was the applicable law for the federal courts in California.131 The United States Supreme 
Court dismissed the indictment, which had been tainted by the illegal, purposeful exclu-
sion of women,132 although the Court acknowledged that the Ballards might again be tried 
and convicted.133 
                                                          
another so he shall act upon it to his legal injury.’”) (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
904 (1986)). 
 122. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[R]eligious leaders may be convicted of fraud for 
making false representations on matters other than faith or experience, as for example if one represents that funds 
are being used to construct a church when in fact they are being used for personal purposes.”). 
 123. Id. at 88 (“the District Court ruled properly when it withheld from the jury all questions concerning the 
truth or falsity of the religious beliefs or doctrines of respondents”); see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The 
Apostle, Mr. Justice Jackson, and the “Pathological Perspective” of the Free Exercise Clause, 65 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1071, 1080 (2008) (“Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, reinstated the district court’s approach.”). 
 124. But see infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text (discussing whether the falsity might have referred to 
the Ballards’ intentions rather than to their religious beliefs about their powers). 
 125. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 81-82 (discussing with approval the trial court’s jury directions: 
“Did these defendants honestly and in good faith believe those things? If they did, they should be acquitted . . . . 
If these defendants did not believe those things, they did not believe that Jesus came down and dictated, or that 
Saint Germain came down and dictated, did not believe the things that they wrote, the things that they preached, 
but used the mail for the purpose of getting money, the jury should find them guilty.”) 
 126. Id. at 88 (“The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further 
proceedings in conformity to this opinion.”). 
 127. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 189 (1946) (“On the remand the Circuit Court of Appeals, 
one judge dissenting, affirmed the judgment of conviction.”). 
 128. Id. at 190. 
 129. See id. at 189-90 (“[W]omen were not included in the panel of grand and petit jurors in the Southern 
District of California where the indictment was returned and the trial had.”). 
 130. See id. at 191 (“In California, as in most States, women are eligible for jury service under local law.”). 
 131. Id. at 190 (“Congress has provided that jurors in a federal court shall have the same qualifications as those 
of the highest court of law in the State.”) (citing Judicial Code § 275, 28 U.S.C. § 411). 
 132. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193 (“Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to 
be found in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. . . . To 
disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic 
ideals of trial by jury.”) (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)). 
 133. Id. at 196 (“The United States may or may not present new charges framed within the limits of our earlier 
opinion. A properly constituted grand jury may or may not return new indictments. Petitioners may or may not 
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Justice Jackson suggested in his concurrence that if the applicable statute required 
not only insincerity but, in addition, that the underlying assertion be provably false,134 
then the fraud conviction could not stand.135 The majority apparently had a different view, 
expecting that the government would re-indict the Ballards.136 
The majority nowhere stated how the finding of insincerity137 could itself suffice 
for a finding of fraud, given the requirement that there be a knowingly false assertion made 
to induce someone to surrender something of value.138 Nonetheless, the dispute between 
Justice Jackson and the majority might be understood in the following way: 
Justice Jackson viewed the requisite false assertion as the claim that the Ballards 
“had, by reason of supernatural attainments, the power to heal persons of ailments and 
diseases and to make well persons afflicted with any diseases, injuries, or ailments.”139 
Because that was a religious belief and the jury was precluded from finding it false, a 
necessary element of fraud (a false representation of a fact or state of affairs) was miss-
ing.140 However, the majority may instead have been focusing on the Ballards’ alleged 
assertion that they would attempt to cure individuals who donated money. If it could be 
shown that the Ballards had no intention of doing anything (perhaps there were incrimi-
nating statements to that effect), then perhaps it could be shown that there was both a false 
assertion (i.e., that the Ballards would attempt to cure donors) and the requisite insincerity 
(if there was evidence that the Ballards knew when making the promise that they had no 
intention of doing anything to cure those who had donated money).141 
Even Justice Jackson did not want to foreclose fraud prosecutions as a general mat-
ter, “for example, if one represents that funds are being used to construct a church when 
                                                          
be convicted a second time.”). 
 134. Id. at 196-97 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“It requires, in my opinion, a provably false representation in 
addition to knowledge of its falsity to make criminal mail fraud.”). 
 135. Id. at 196-97 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“This leaves no statutory basis for conviction of fraud and espe-
cially no basis for conviction under this indictment.”). After the Ballard decision was issued, the prosecution 
decided not to charge the Ballards again. See Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 887, 894 (2009)(“[T]he prosecution may have been convinced by Justice Jackson’s reasoning; in any event, 
no additional charges were filed and the “I Am” movement appears to have been thriving through at least 1950.”). 
 136. See Meyler, supra note 135, at 894 (“[T]he majority seemed assured that the federal government would 
simply reindict the Ballards.”). 
 137. The majority held that that the jury could reach the Ballard’s sincerity but could not address the underly-
ing truth or falsity of the religious claims. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87 (“[I]f those [religious] doctrines are subject 
to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious 
beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain”) The Supreme 
Court reversed the circuit court’s holding that restricting the issue to the sincerity of belief was error. See id. at 
83 (“The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction and granted a new trial, one judge dis-
senting. In its view the restriction of the issue in question to that of good faith was error.”) (citation omitted); id. 
at 88 (“The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceed-
ings in conformity to this opinion.”). 
 138. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Ballard, 322 U.S. at 80. 
 140. See Ballard, 329 U.S. at 196 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[I]t is improper for the trial court to inquire 
whether the religious professions and experiences as represented by defendants were true or false but that . . . 
leaves no statutory basis for conviction of fraud.”). 
 141. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 553 (1977) (“One who by a fraudulent misrepresentation, or by 
the nondisclosure of a fact which as between himself and another it is his duty to disclose, intentionally induces 
the other to make a gift to him or to a third person is subject to liability to the donor for the loss caused by the 
making of the gift.”). 
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in fact they are being used for personal purposes.”142 Nonetheless, Justice Jackson wanted 
to foreclose such prosecutions where the allegedly false assertion was itself a religious 
belief. 
One of the unexplored difficulties raised by the Ballard case involves the potential 
missteps that might be taken by jury members insofar as they were attempting to make the 
requisite sincerity assessment. At the very least, careful jury instructions would have to be 
offered. Else, the sincerity test might simply be another way of asking the jury about the 
plausibility of the beliefs—jury members might say that they could not find that the de-
fendant sincerely believed something that they themselves found incredible. The Court 
was sensitive to the possibility that an unsympathetic jury might well find certain beliefs 
false,143 and the same attitude might make a jury less sympathetic to the claim that anyone 
could sincerely hold such views.144 
E.  Special Treatment for Religion? 
Just as the nineteenth century ambivalence about whether polygamy was a religious 
rather than a non-religious practice was also present in the twentieth century case law,145 
the nineteenth century ambivalence about whether the Constitution afforded religious 
practice special treatment was also present in the twentieth century case law.146 Everson 
v. Board of Education147 is a good example. At issue was the authorization of reimburse-
ment to parents of transportation costs to parochial schools.148 The appellant, a tax-
payer,149 claimed, inter alia, that this expenditure was “an establishment of religion.”150 
The Court disagreed.151 
While the focus of the decision was on whether the reimbursement program violated 
Establishment Clause guarantees, the Court also addressed free exercise protections, not-
ing that “other language of the [First] amendment commands that New Jersey cannot ham-
per its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion.”152 The way that the Court spelled 
out those protections was worthy of note, because the Court reasoned that the state was 
                                                          
 142. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 87 (“The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer 
are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment 
found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.”). 
 144. See Krotoszynski, supra note 123, at 1075 (“[I]f minority religions and religionists face pervasive forms 
of discrimination and widespread hostility within the general culture, is a trial limited to subjective belief likely 
to afford an adequate margin of protection for strange, or even offensive, religious beliefs?”). 
 145. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of this ambivalence in Reynolds. 
 147. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 148. Id. at 3 (discussing New Jersey statute which authorized school district to “authorize[] reimbursement to 
parents of money expended by them for the bus transportation of their children on regular busses operated by the 
public transportation system. Part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some children in the 
community to Catholic parochial schools.”). 
 149. Id. (discussing the “appellant, in his capacity as a district taxpayer”). 
 150. Id. at 8. 
 151. Id. at 17 (“[W]e cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised 
funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares 
of pupils attending public and other schools.”). 
 152. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
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constitutionally precluded from “exclud[ing] individual Catholics, Lutherans, Moham-
medans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any 
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare 
legislation.”153 Here, the Court implied that free exercise guarantees were not reserved for 
those professing a religion, because they also applied to “Non-believers” and to those lack-
ing faith.154 Perhaps the Court had in mind some of the difficulties associated with deter-
mining what counts as a religion.155 
In Torcaso v. Watkins,156 the Court examined the constitutionality of a religious test 
for employment—the appellant was denied a commission as a notary public because he 
would not affirm his belief in God’s existence.157 The Court held that “[t]his Maryland 
religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant’s freedom of belief 
and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him.”158 
Torcaso can be interpreted in a number of ways. Insofar as the state is seeking to 
privilege certain religious beliefs over others, the requirement implicates Establishment 
Clause guarantees.159 In addition, requiring an individual to assert something contrary to 
faith160 implicates free exercise concerns.161 
Insofar as the focus is on free exercise, one way to understand the Court’s decision 
is that the state cannot privilege religion over non-religion,162 although a different way to 
understand the decision is that the State cannot privilege theocentric religions over non-
theocentric religions.163 In a footnote, the Court noted several “religions in this country 
which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of 
God.”164 
Arguably, the Maryland requirement at issue in Torcaso violated both establishment 
and free exercise guarantees, and at least one question involves how to distinguish between 
the requirements of each. The Court in Engel v. Vitale165 provided a partial answer. 
                                                          
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. Id. 
 155. See infra notes 353-410 and accompanying text. 
 156. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 157. Id. at 489 (“The appellant Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Mar-
yland but was refused a commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God.”). 
 158. Id. at 496. 
 159. Id. at 490 (discussing “the formal or practical ‘establishment’ of particular religious faiths in most of the 
Colonies”); see also Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 759 
(1984) (“Striking down a state law that required office holders to declare a belief in God, the Court in Torcaso 
v. Watkins indicated that Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism (at least in the organized 
form of the Fellowship of Humanity) were religions; and it held that the state’s preference for theistic religions 
over nontheistic ones violated the establishment clause.”). 
 160. See Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 (“[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a 
person ‘to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.’”) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 15). 
 161. Id. at 490 (discussing the “burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of nonfavored believers”). 
 162. Id. at 495 (“[N]either a State nor the Federal Government . . . can constitutionally pass laws or impose 
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers.”). 
 163. Id. (“[N]either a State nor the Federal Government . . . aid those religions based on a belief in the exist-
ence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”). 
 164. Id. at 495 n.11. 
 165. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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Engel involved an official prayer to start the school day. The prayer at issue, “Al-
mighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon 
us, our parents, our teachers and our Country,”166 was struck down as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause.167 
The Court distinguished between establishment and free exercise by noting: “The 
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing 
of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which estab-
lish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving indi-
viduals or not.”168 Here, the Court implied that free exercise guarantees may be violated 
when “laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals.”169 At least one question 
raised by such a distinction is whether the coercion of non-observant individuals itself 
violates free exercise guarantees (regardless of what those individuals actually believe) or 
whether such coercion is a violation only because the coercion contravenes religious be-
liefs that the (non-observant) individual has. If the former view accurately captures the 
relevant protections, then free exercise guarantees preclude an individual from being co-
erced to do or say something religious even if the individual has no religious beliefs of her 
own. However, if the latter is accurate, then free exercise guarantees preclude an individual 
from being coerced to do or say something religious only if the individual has religious 
beliefs of her own that would be contravened were the person to succumb to the coercion. 
Consider School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,170 which involved the 
constitutionality of prayers beginning the school day.171 Pennsylvania law required that 
Bible verses be read every day, although children would be excused with a written note 
from their parents.172 The Schempps, Unitarians, challenged the law.173 While Edward 
Schempp had considered having his children excused, he believed that their leaving the 
classroom during these readings would put them at a disadvantage.174 
                                                          
 166. Id. at 422. 
 167. Id. at 424 (“We think that by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents’ prayer, 
the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.”). 
 168. Id. at 430. The Court wants to differentiate the two in other respects as well. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n 
of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) (“The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are 
by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. To equate the two 
would be to deny a national heritage with roots in the Revolution itself.”) See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 409 (1963) (“[P]lainly we are not fostering the ‘establishment’ of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in 
South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers 
reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does 
not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment 
Clause to forestall.”). 
 169. Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. 
 170. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
 171. Id. at 205 (“These companion cases present the issues in the context of state action requiring that schools 
begin each day with readings from the Bible.”). 
 172. Id. (“The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law . . . requires that [a]t least ten verses from the Holy 
Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall 
be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or 
guardian.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 173. Id. at 206 (“The appellees Edward Lewis Schempp, his wife Sidney, and their children, Roger and Donna, 
are of the Unitarian faith.”). 
 174. Id. at 208 (“Schempp testified at the second trial that he had considered having Roger and Donna excused 
from attendance at the exercises but decided against it for several reasons, including his belief that the children’s 
relationships with their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected.”). 
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The Court struck down the state law on Establishment Clause grounds,175 but made 
numerous points about free exercise protections while doing so. For example, the Court 
noted that the Free Exercise Clause “recognizes the value of religious training, teaching 
and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely choose his own 
course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state.”176 Echoing analyses 
previously offered in the case law, the Court explained that “it is necessary in a free exer-
cise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in 
the practice of his religion.”177 The Schempp comment suggests that free exercise guaran-
tees are implicated only if an individual is coerced to do something that violates his reli-
gious beliefs. 
Yet, the Schempp Court’s understanding of what counted as religion seemed rather 
broad—one of the questions presented was whether prohibiting Bible-reading would cre-
ate a “religion of secularism” in the schools.178 The Court agreed that it was impermissible 
to “establish a ‘religion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing 
hostility to religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do 
believe,’”179 although the Court rejected that its ruling had that impermissible effect.180 
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan noted that “the line which separates the secular 
from the sectarian in American life is elusive.”181 Explaining that “our religious compo-
sition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers,”182 he pointed out 
that “[t]oday the Nation is far more heterogeneous religiously, including as it does sub-
stantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as well of those who worship ac-
cording to no version of the Bible and those who worship no God at all.”183 Here, Justice 
Brennan included among the religious “those who worship no God at all,”184 citing to 
Torcaso’s discussion of “those religions founded on different beliefs,”185 those beliefs not 
predicated on the existence of God or, perhaps, beliefs predicated on the non-existence of 
God. 
F.  Conflicts Between Religious and Civil Requirements 
Many free exercise cases do not involve the state’s requiring an individual to engage 
in a religious practice such as affirming a belief in God (if only because of the Establish-
ment Clause issues implicated by such requirements). Instead, the state requires an indi-
vidual to do (or, perhaps, refrain from doing) something secular in contravention of the 
                                                          
 175. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.”). 
 176. Id. at 222. 
 177. Id. at 223. 
 178. See id. at 225. 
 179. Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S., 306, 314 (1952)). 
 180. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (“We do not agree, however, that this decision in any sense has that effect.”). 
 181. Id. at 231 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 182. Id. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 183. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring). See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965) (discussing “the 
richness and variety of spiritual life in our country”). 
 184. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 185. Torcaso, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
19
Strasser: Definitions, Religion, and Free Exercise Guarantees
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
20 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1 
 
individual’s firmly held religious beliefs. Sherbert v. Verner186 involved a Seventh Day 
Adventist, Adell Sherbert, who lost her job because she refused to work on her Sabbath, 
Saturday.187 She was unable to secure other employment because those employers re-
quired Saturday work, and she applied for unemployment compensation.188 Her applica-
tion was denied because her reason for refusing Saturday work was not viewed as “good 
cause.”189 
The Sherbert Court explained that free exercise challenges to state regulations have 
not been successful when “[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have . . . posed some sub-
stantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”190 However, because the refusal to work 
on Saturday posed no such threat,191 the Court reasoned that the South Carolina refusal 
would be upheld only if (1) that refusal did not constitute an infringement of free exercise 
guarantees, or (2) while it was an infringement, it was justified because narrowly tailored 
to promote compelling state interests.192 
The Court rejected (1), reasoning that the statute burdened Sherbert’s free exercise 
rights: “the pressure upon her to forego . . . [her religious] practice is unmistakable.”193 
Basically, she was forced to “choose between following the precepts of her religion and 
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in 
order to accept work, on the other hand.”194 Because such a forced choice abridged free 
exercise guarantees,195 South Carolina was precluded from denying Sherbert unemploy-
ment compensation. 
Sherbert suggests that religion can be treated differently from non-religion—an in-
dividual unavailable for work for personal (non-religious) reasons would likely not have 
been afforded an exemption.196 United States v. Seeger197 and Welsh v. United States198 
also support that religion is privileged over non-religion, although they suggest that the 
distinction between religion and non-religion must be spelled out in a way that places more 
                                                          
 186. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 187. Id. at 399 (“Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was discharged by her South 
Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.”). 
 188. Id. at 399-400 (“She filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina 
Unemployment Compensation Act.”). 
 189. Id. at 401. 
 190. Id. at 403 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145). 
 191. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (“Plainly enough, appellant’s conscientious objection to Saturday work consti-
tutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation.”). 
 192. Id. (“[I]t must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the 
State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appel-
lant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s 
constitutional power to regulate.’”) (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
 193. Id. at 404. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See id. at 410 (“Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility 
provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.”). 
 196. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“What the Court is holding is that if the State chooses 
to condition unemployment compensation on the applicant’s availability for work, it is constitutionally compelled 
to carve out an exception—and to provide benefits—for those whose unavailability is due to their religious con-
victions.”). 
 197. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 198. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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in the religion category than might originally be thought.199 
Seeger involved whether a particular individual was entitled to conscientious objec-
tor status. Daniel Seeger “was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form 
by reason of his ‘religious’ belief; . . . [although] he preferred to leave the question as to 
his belief in a Supreme Being open, ‘rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no.’”200 He testified that 
“his ‘skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God’ did ‘not necessarily mean lack of 
faith in anything whatsoever’; that his was a ‘belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue 
for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.”201 His belief was sin-
cere,202 but he was denied the conscientious objector status because his deeply held beliefs 
were not connected to a belief in a Supreme Being.203 
Congress had “declared that ‘religious training and belief’ was to be defined as ‘an 
individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those aris-
ing from any human relation, but (not including) essentially political, sociological, or phil-
osophical views or a merely personal moral code.’”204 The Court noted that the conflict 
was not “between theistic and atheistic beliefs,”205 but instead a conflict of interpretation 
of Supreme Being pitting “the orthodox God . . . [against] the broader concept of a power 
or being, or a faith, ‘to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately 
dependent.’”206 
The statute precluded certain people from being awarded conscientious objector sta-
tus—”those whose opposition to war stems from a ‘merely personal moral code,’”207 or 
“those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis of essentially politi-
cal, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that they will have no 
part of it.”208 The distinction at issue did not involve the conflict “between theistic and 
atheistic beliefs”209—the merits of any such challenge would have to be addressed on 
another day.210 
When interpreting the applicable test, the Court concluded that a “sincere and mean-
ingful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the 
God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory defini-
tion.”211 By interpreting congressional intent that way, the Court was able to “avoid[] im-
puting to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and 
                                                          
 199. See infra notes 206-22 and accompanying text (discussing more and less traditional approaches to reli-
gion). 
 200. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. at 166-67 (“His belief was found to be sincere, honest, and made in good faith.”). 
 203. Id. at 167 (“Seeger’s belief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood.”). 
 204. Id. at 172. 
 205. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173. 
 206. Id. at 174 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY). 
 207. Id. at 173. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173-74 (“The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs. We 
do not deal with or intimate any decision on that situation in these cases.”). 
 211. Id. at 176. 
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excluding others.”212 
The Court discussed various views that would count as religious, including a view 
identifying “God not as a projection ‘out there’ or beyond the skies but as the ground of 
our very being,”213 and a view of religion that was “anthropocentric, not theocentric,”214 
which involved “the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive.”215 Seeger 
cited United States v. Kauten216 with approval,217 an opinion that Justice Frankfurter also 
cited with approval when pointing to ways in which state officials could permissibly dis-
tinguish between religion and non-religion.218 
Justice Frankfurter worried that a determination of “whether a cause is, or is not, 
‘religious’ opens up too wide a field of personal judgment to be left to the mere discretion 
of an official.”219 Nonetheless, he cited to an opinion of Judge Augustus Hand, which 
involved an “allowable range of judgment regarding the scope of ‘religion.’”220 Judge 
Hand explained: 
 
There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in a con-
viction that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a conscien-
tious objection to participation in any war under any circumstances. The 
latter, and not the former, may be the basis of exemption under the Act. 
The former is usually a political objection, while the latter, we think, 
may justly be regarded as a response of the individual to an inward men-
tor, call it conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present time 
the equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse.221 
 
The suggestion that an objection to all wars be classified as religious for purposes of 
the conscientious objector statute played an important role in Welsh v. United States.222 
At issue in Welsh was whether Elliot Welsh, II, was entitled to claim conscientious objec-
tor status, notwithstanding his refusal to base his sincere opposition to all war on religious 
grounds223 in the “conventional sense”224 of that term. However, the Court noted that 
“very few registrants are fully aware of the broad scope of the word ‘religious’ as used in 
§ 6(j), and accordingly a registrant’s statement that his beliefs are nonreligious is a highly 
                                                          
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 180 (citing Paul Tillich, including a quotation from his book II Systematic Theology 12 (1957)). 
 214. Id. at 183. 
 215. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 183 (citing DR. DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, ETHICS AS A RELIGION (1951)). 
 216. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 217. See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 179. 
 218. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. 
 219. Saia v. People of State of New York, 334 U.S. 558, 564 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); but cf. 
Greenawalt, supra note 159, at 762 (“[F]or constitutional purposes, religion should be determined by the close-
ness of analogy in the relevant respects between the disputed instance and what is indisputably religion.”). 
 220. Saia, 334 U.S. at 564 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citing Kauten, 133 F.2d at 708). 
 221. Kauten, 133 F.2d at 708. 
 222. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 223. See id. at 341 (“Welsh was far more insistent and explicit than Seeger in denying that his views were 
religious.”). 
 224. Id. at 342. 
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unreliable guide for those charged with administering the exemption,”225 and Welsh did 
characterize his beliefs as “religious in the ethical sense of the word.”226 
The Welsh Court distinguished “views that are ‘essentially political, sociological, or 
philosophical’ or of those who have a ‘merely personal moral code’”227 on the one hand 
from those “whose consciences [are] spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious 
beliefs.”228 The latter are those exempted by [§] 6(j) from military service.229 Basically, 
the criterion used by the Court was whether the relevant “beliefs play the role of a religion 
and function as a religion in the registrant’s life.”230 
The Welsh Court was interpreting a federal statute,231 and a separate issue was 
whether the Constitution required a similar result.232 Justice Harlan argued in his concur-
rence that “having chosen to exempt, [Congress] cannot draw the line between theistic or 
nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other.”233 In con-
trast, Justice White argued in dissent that even if a conscientious objection exemption for 
the religious was constitutionally required, a similar exemption for the nonreligious would 
not be constitutionally required.234 
A separate issue was whether Congress was required to create a conscientious ob-
jector exemption at all. Justice Harlan argued that Congress “could, entirely consistently 
with the requirements of the Constitution, eliminate all exemptions for conscientious ob-
jectors.”235 The Court had another opportunity to address the degree to which free exercise 
guarantees required a conscientious objector exemption the following year. 
Gillette v. United States236 involved two challenges to the denial of conscientious 
objector status by individuals who refused to serve in the Vietnam War.237 One was by 
Guy Gillette, whose understanding “of his duty to abstain from any involvement in a war 
seen as unjust . . . [was] ‘based on a humanist approach to religion,’ . . . guided by funda-
mental principles of conscience and deeply held views about the purpose and obligation 
of human existence.”238 The other was by Louis Negre, who believed that it was “his duty 
as a faithful Catholic to discriminate between ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ wars, and to forswear 
                                                          
 225. Id. at 341. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Kauten, 133 F.2d at 343 (citing section 6(j)). 
 228. Id. at 344. 
 229. See id. 
 230. Id. at 339. 
 231. See id. at 343-44 (discussing what the federal statute exempts). 
 232. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 159, at 760-61 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s broad statutory construction of reli-
gion, as well as its decision in Torcaso, has led other courts and scholars to assume that the constitutional defi-
nition of religion is now much more extensive than it once appeared to be.”). 
 233. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). 
 234. See id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting) (“a statutory exemption for religionists required by the Free Exercise 
Clause is not an invalid establishment because it fails to include nonreligious believers as well”). 
 235. Id. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). 
 236. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
 237. See id. at 439 (“Petitioner [Gillette] concluded that he could not in conscience enter and serve in the 
armed forces during the period of the Vietnam conflict.”); Gillette, 401 U.S. at 440 (“Negre ‘objects to the war 
in Vietnam, not to all wars’”) (citing Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908, 909-10 (9th Cir. 1969), aff’d sub nom. 
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)). 
 238. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 440. 
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participation in the latter.”239 
The Court declined to follow the model suggested in the previous case law where 
the focus was on how to categorize the beliefs at issue,240 expressly noting that the ques-
tion presented was “not whether these petitioners’ beliefs concerning war are ‘religious’ 
in nature”241 or even whether “conscientious objection to a particular war necessarily falls 
within § 6(j)’s expressly excluded class of ‘essentially political, sociological, or philosoph-
ical views, or a merely personal moral code.’”242 Rather, the Court instead focused on the 
text of the statute whose “language, on a straightforward reading, can bear but one mean-
ing; that conscientious scruples relating to war and military service must amount to con-
scientious opposition to participating personally in any war and all war.”243 
Given that reading, the Court had to address the constitutionality of Congress’s fail-
ure to provide conscientious objector status to those with religious objections to participa-
tion in some but not all wars.244 The Court noted that “§ 6(j), on its face, simply does not 
discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or religious belief, apart of course from 
beliefs concerning war.”245 While “the special statutory status accorded conscientious ob-
jection to all war, but not objection to a particular war, works a de facto discrimination 
among religions,”246 the Court held that Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute was 
not to favor some religions over others but, instead, to further secular goals.247 Further, 
Congress’s distinguishing as it did promoted “fairness”248 and “serve[d] an overriding 
interest in protecting the integrity of democratic decisionmaking against claims to individ-
ual noncompliance.”249 While recognizing that “the Free Exercise Clause may condemn 
certain applications clashing with imperatives of religion and conscience, when the burden 
on First Amendment values is not justifiable in terms of the Government’s valid aims,”250 
the Court held that the burdens imposed in this case were “strictly justified.”251 
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the First Amendment protects conscience 
rather than religion per se. He noted that while “the First Amendment speaks of the free 
exercise of religion, not of the free exercise of conscience or belief, . . . conscience and 
belief are the main ingredients of First Amendment rights.”252 He would have held that 
both Seeger and Negre should be afforded conscientious objector status, because Con-
                                                          
 239. Id. at 441. 
 240. See id. at 447 (“our cases explicating the ‘religious training and belief’ clause of s 6(j), or cognate clauses 
of predecessor provisions, are not relevant to the present issue”). 
 241. Id. at 447. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 443 (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970)). 
 244. Id. at 448 (“Both petitioners argue that s 6[j], construed to cover only objectors to all war, violates the 
religious clauses of the First Amendment.”). 
 245. Id. at 450. 
 246. Id. at 451-52. 
 247. Id. at 454 (“We conclude not only that the affirmative purposes underlying s 6(j) are neutral and secular, 
but also that valid neutral reasons exist for limiting the exemption to objectors to all war, and that the section 
therefore cannot be said to reflect a religious preference.”). 
 248. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 458. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 462 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)). 
 251. Id. at 462. 
 252. Id. at 465-66 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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gress’s distinguishing between those conscientiously opposed to all wars and those con-
scientiously opposed to some wars was unconstitutional.253 
The very next year, the Court seemed to change direction yet again.254 In Wisconsin 
v. Yoder,255 the Court examined a Wisconsin law requiring students to remain in school 
until they reached age sixteen.256 Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy, who were 
Amish,257 did not want their children, ages fourteen and fifteen, to attend public school 
past the eighth grade.258 Yoder et al were tried and fined for failure to comply with the 
compulsory schooling law.259 They argued that having their children attend those schools 
would violate their religious beliefs260—indeed, the respondents “believed that by sending 
their children to high school, they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the 
censure of the church community, but . . . also endanger their own salvation and that of 
their children.”261 
These Amish parents believed that high school would undermine the values that they 
sought to impart to their children. “The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and 
scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social 
life with other students.”262 In contrast, “Amish society emphasizes informal learning-
through-doing; a life of ‘goodness,’ rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than tech-
nical knowledge, community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather 
than integration with, contemporary worldly society.”263 
The Yoder Court reasoned that “a State’s interest in universal education . . . is not 
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, 
such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.”264 In order for the Wisconsin statute to be upheld, “it must appear either that the 
State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is 
a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under 
the Free Exercise Clause.”265 
Yoder discussed the negative “impact that compulsory high school attendance could 
have on the continued survival of Amish communities as they exist in the United States 
                                                          
 253. See Gillette, 401 U.S. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he constitutional infirmity in the present Act 
seems obvious once ‘conscience’ is the guide.”). 
 254. Antony Barone Kolenc, Not “For God and Country”: Atheist Military Chaplains and the Free Exercise 
Clause, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 395, 410 (2014) (“[T]he Supreme Court backed away from this expansive view of 
religion . . . [i]n Wisconsin v. Yoder”). 
 255. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 256. Id. at 207 (“Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend 
public or private school until reaching age 16.”). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 208. 
 260. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209 (“[T]heir children’s attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to 
the Amish religion and way of life.”). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 211. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 214. 
 265. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. 
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today,”266 although more had to be shown that that the Amish children might be influenced 
by “teachers who are not of the Amish faith—and may even be hostile to it.”267 In addition, 
it was necessary to show the religious basis of the threatened way of life. “A way of life, 
however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state 
regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations.”268 The Yoder Court 
explained that “to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted 
in religious belief.”269 
If the Religion Clauses only afford protection to claims “rooted in religious be-
lief,”270 then it will be necessary to distinguish among kinds of beliefs. While acknowl-
edging that “a determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to constitu-
tional protection may present a most delicate question,”271 the Yoder Court nonetheless 
reasoned that “the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make 
his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important inter-
ests.”272 For example, “if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective eval-
uation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as 
Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their 
claims would not rest on a religious basis.”273 The Court announced that “Thoreau’s 
choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise 
to the demands of the Religion Clauses.”274 
Regrettably, the Court did not explain what made Thoreau’s choice philosophical 
and personal.275 It was not clear, for example, whether the Court believed Thoreau’s be-
liefs failed to “play the role of a religion and function as a religion in . . . [his] life.”276 
Instead, the Court explained what sufficed about the Amish beliefs to entitle them to pro-
tection—”the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal pref-
erence, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately 
related to daily living.”277 
By contrasting Thoreau’s personal (idiosyncratic?) preferences with those shared by 
an organized group, Yoder raises whether actions must be based on shared values in order 
to trigger free exercise guarantees. That question was addressed in Thomas v. Review 
                                                          
 266. Id. at 209. 
 267. Id. at 211. 
 268. Id. at 215. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 
 271. Id.; see also Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84 MINN. L. 
REV. 589, 615 (2000) (discussing “the constitutional and institutional impediments to defining religion”). 
 272. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16. 
 273. Id. at 216. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See George C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion”, 71 
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1528 (1983) (“The Court simply asserted in Yoder, however, that Thoreau might be classified as 
a paradigm of the secular believer. The Court made no attempt either to explain or to justify this classification.”); 
Scott C. Idleman, The Underlying Causes of Divergent First Amendment Interpretations, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 
67, 73-74 (2008) (“the Court has explained that the religion does not encompass ‘purely secular considerations’ 
or ‘philosophical and personal’ beliefs such as those held by Henry David Thoreau, but this category remains 
elusive as well.”). 
 276. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339 (1970). 
 277. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. 
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Board.278 
At issue was the denial of a claim by Eddie Thomas for unemployment compensa-
tion.279 Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness,280 worked at a roll foundry making sheet metal for 
industrial use.281 When the foundry closed, he was transferred to another department mak-
ing tank turrets.282 Because he could not make war weapons as a matter of conscience,283 
he checked to see if there was a different position within the company that he could occupy 
without violating his conscience.284 But none were available, and he quit his job rather 
than violate his religious convictions.285 
His application for unemployment benefits was denied,286 allegedly because “the 
belief was more ‘personal philosophical choice’ than religious belief.”287 One of the fac-
tors contributing to the judgment that Thomas’s reasons were more personal than religious 
was that a friend of his, also a Jehovah’s Witness, had told him that it was “‘scripturally’ 
acceptable”288 to make the turrets. Thomas disagreed with that interpretation, “con-
clud[ing] that his friend’s view was based upon a less strict reading of Witnesses’ princi-
ples than his own.”289 The Thomas Court noted that it is not unusual for members of the 
same faith tradition to have differing understandings of their religious obligations,290 be-
lieving “the judicial process . . . singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in rela-
tion to the Religion Clauses.”291 While conceding that it is possible to “imagine an asserted 
claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection 
under the Free Exercise Clause,”292 the Court emphasized that “the guarantee of free ex-
ercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious 
sect.”293 
Once it was established that Thomas’s refusal to work implicated free exercise guar-
antees, the state had to establish that its interests were sufficiently compelling and the 
means chosen sufficiently closely tailored to justify its infringement of Thomas’s religious 
liberty.294 The Court rejected the state’s suggestion that “the number of people who find 
                                                          
 278. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 279. See id. at 709. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 710. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710 (“[H]e could not work on weapons without violating the principles of his reli-
gion.”). 
 284. Id. (“He checked the bulletin board where in-plant openings were listed, and discovered that all of the 
remaining departments at Blaw-Knox were engaged directly in the production of weapons.”). 
 285. Id. (“[H]e quit, asserting that he could not work on weapons without violating the principles of his reli-
gion.”). 
 286. See id. at 711. 
 287. Id. at 713 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1131 (1979), rev’d 450 U.S. 707 (1981)). 
 288. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
 289. Id. at 711. 
 290. Id. at 715 (“Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed.”). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
  293. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 708. 
 294. See id. at 718 (“The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive 
means of achieving some compelling state interest.”). 
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themselves in the predicament of choosing between benefits and religious beliefs is large 
enough to create ‘widespread unemployment,’ or even to seriously affect unemploy-
ment.”295 Basically, the Court believed Sherbert controlling and struck down Indiana’s 
refusal to award the benefits.296 
While the Thomas Court reiterated that “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the 
exercise of religion,”297 the interpretation of what would not count as religious—“an as-
serted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to pro-
tection under the Free Exercise Clause”298—seems rather forgiving. After reiterating that 
the “determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a diffi-
cult and delicate task,”299 the Court explained the approach the courts should not take—
“the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular 
belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, 
or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”300 
In Thomas, the Court refused to take sides when individuals of a particular sect dis-
agreed about the content of particular religious obligations. Suppose, however, that an in-
dividual does not identify with a particular sect but nonetheless claims particular benefits 
by virtue of free exercise protections. Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Secu-
rity301 involved an individual’s sincere302 refusal to work based on his “personal professed 
religious belief.”303 However, William Frazee did not belong to a particular sect and was 
not a member of a particular church.304 Basically, he identified as a Christian and believed 
that it was religiously inappropriate to work on Sunday.305 The Frazee Court noted that in 
the previous unemployment decisions involving claims of free exercise infringement, the 
claimant had been a member of a religious sect.306 However, those decisions had not been 
predicated on sect membership. Instead, the “judgments in those cases rested on the fact 
that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that religion required him or her to refrain 
from the work in question.”307 Further, the Court never suggested that “unless a claimant 
belongs to a sect that forbids what his job requires, his belief, however sincere, must be 
                                                          
 295. Id. at 719. 
 296. Id. at 720 (“Unless we are prepared to overrule Sherbert, Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due him 
on the basis of the findings of the referee, the Review Board, and the Indiana Court of Appeals that he terminated 
his employment because of his religious convictions.”). 
 297. Id. at 713 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 
(1972)). 
 298. 450 U.S. 707, 715. 
 299. Id. at 714. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
 302. Id. at 831(“The court characterized Frazee’s refusal to work as resting on his “personal professed religious 
belief,” and made it clear that it did “not question the sincerity of the plaintiff.”) (quoting Frazee v. Dep’t of 
Emp’t Sec., 512 N.E.2d 789, 791 (Ill. App. 1987),  rev’d, 489 U.S. 829 (1989)). 
 303. Id. (citing Frazee, 512 N.E.2d at 790). 
 304. Id. (“Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect or church.”). 
 305. Id. (discussing “Frazee’s position that he was ‘a Christian’ and as such felt it wrong to work on Sunday”). 
 306. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 832 (“It is true . . . that each of the claimants in those cases was a member of a 
particular religious sect.”). 
 307. Id. at 833. 
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deemed a purely personal preference rather than a religious belief.”308 
The Frazee Court reiterated its appreciation of the difficulty in “distinguishing be-
tween religious and secular convictions and in determining whether a professed belief is 
sincerely held.”309 Nonetheless, such determinations are important, because “[o]nly be-
liefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,”310 and “[p]urely secular 
views” do not suffice.311 Further, “[s]tates are clearly entitled to assure themselves that 
there is an ample predicate for invoking the Free Exercise Clause”312 and “membership in 
an organized religious denomination, especially one with a specific tenet forbidding mem-
bers to work on Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely held religious 
beliefs.”313 The Court nonetheless expressly “reject[ed] the notion that to claim the pro-
tection of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the commands of a partic-
ular religious organization.”314 
Because denying Frazee benefits triggered free exercise guarantees, the state was 
required to show that it had a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the imposition of a 
burden. The Court suggested that while “there may exist state interests sufficiently com-
pelling to override a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion,”315 no such interests 
had been asserted in the instant case.316 
In Employment Division v. Smith,317 the Court construed free exercise protections 
in a way that undermined their reach.318 Two drug counselors, Alfred Smith and Galen 
Black, had been fired from their jobs for their sacramental use of peyote.319 Their appli-
cations for unemployment compensation were denied, because they had been fired for 
work-related misconduct.320 
Smith and Black argued that “their religious motivation for using peyote places them 
beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious prac-
tice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other 
reasons.”321 The Court rejected that position, suggesting that “an individual’s religious 
                                                          
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981)). 
 311. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833 (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)). 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. at 834. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. at 835. 
 316. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 835 (“No such interest has been presented here.”). 
 317. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 318. Mark G. Yudof, Religious Liberty in the Balance, 47 SMU L. REV. 353, 354 (1994) (“[I]n Employment 
Division v. Smith the Supreme Court adopted a crabbed vision of the free exercise of religion that undermines 
our religious freedoms.”). 
 319. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (“Alfred Smith and Galen Black (hereinafter respondents) were fired from their 
jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a 
ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are members.”). 
 320. Id. (“When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division (hereinafter petitioner) for unemploy-
ment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for 
work-related ‘misconduct.’”). 
 321. Id. at 878. 
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beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting con-
duct that the State is free to regulate.”322 Thus, “the right of free exercise does not relieve 
an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applica-
bility on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion pre-
scribes (or proscribes).’”323 The Court explained that the apparent exceptions to this rule 
“involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction 
with other constitutional protections.”324 As examples, the Court cited, inter alia, Cant-
well v. Connecticut,325 described as also including “freedom of speech and of the 
press,”326 Murdock v. Pennsylvania,327 described as “invalidating a flat tax on solicitation 
as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas,”328 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,329 described 
as “invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who re-
fused on religious grounds to send their children to school.”330 The Court interpreted the 
case before it as not involving “such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim uncon-
nected with any communicative activity or parental right.”331 In addition, the Court held 
that the Sherbert balancing test should not be applied “to require exemptions from a gen-
erally applicable criminal law.”332 
Reasoning that the case law precludes the courts from “presum[ing] to determine the 
place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim,”333 the 
Smith Court suggested that “[i]f the ‘compelling interest’ test is to be applied at all, then, 
it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded.”334 
But  
 
[p]recisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of 
almost every conceivable religious preference,’335 and precisely be-
cause we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford 
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious 
objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of 
the highest order.336  
 
                                                          
 322. Id. at 878-79. 
 323. Id. at 879 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judg-
ment)). 
 324. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 325. Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940)). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 882. 
 332. Id. at 884. 
 333. Id. at 887. 
 334. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
 335. Id. (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961)). 
 336. Id. 
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Raising the specter of Reynolds, the Court believed its approach preferable to a “sys-
tem in which each conscience is a law unto itself”337 or to a system “in which judges weigh 
the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”338 
Smith contradicts the past jurisprudence, which does not require a hybrid right to be 
at issue in order for strict scrutiny to be triggered.339 However, the Smith Court captures 
the spirit of the past jurisprudence when suggesting that courts are not competent to judge 
the centrality of religious beliefs340 and, further, is correct that applying a version of strict 
scrutiny that has not been watered down will mean that many laws will have to include 
religious exemptions in order to pass constitutional muster.341 
Smith’s citation to Reynolds is unsurprising, because the Reynolds Court also wor-
ried about recognizing religious exemptions to criminal law. However, the tacks taken by 
the Smith and Reynolds Courts differed in an important respect. The Reynolds Court rea-
soned that polygamy was so inimical to societal interests that it could be subject to criminal 
prosecution even if qualifying as a religious practice.342 However, the Smith Court did not 
adopt an approach in which the alleged harms of the practice at issue were magnified—
rather than employ Justice O’Connor’s rationale in her Smith concurring opinion that the 
War Against Drugs involved such a compelling interest that the Oregon law should be 
upheld,343 the Court instead suggested that statutes burdening religious practices do not 
trigger strict scrutiny unless involving hybrid rights.344 Perhaps the Smith Court adopted 
this approach because it realized that sacramental use of peyote could not plausibly be 
described as extremely dangerous, given the state’s refusal to prosecute345 and the absence 
of harm traced to such sacramental use.346 Or, perhaps because the Court had so often 
upheld state practices burdening free exercise while allegedly employing strict scrutiny, 
the Court wanted to restore some integrity to its strict scrutiny jurisprudence347 while 
                                                          
 337. Id. at 890. 
 338. Id. 
 339. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 599 (suggesting that Sunday closing laws pass muster under strict scrutiny); 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (suggesting that the refusal to exempt Amish employers from paying 
into the Social Security system passes muster under strict scrutiny). 
 340. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unac-
ceptable ‘business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.’”) (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 
n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
 341. Id. at 888 (“Moreover, if ‘compelling interest’ really means what it says (and watering it down here would 
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test.”). 
 342. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
 343. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 907 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would therefore adhere to our 
established free exercise jurisprudence and hold that the State in this case has a compelling interest in regulating 
peyote use by its citizens and that accommodating respondents’ religiously motivated conduct ‘will unduly in-
terfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest.’”) (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 259). 
 344. See id. at 881-82. 
 345. See id. at 911 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“In this case, the State actually has not evinced any concrete 
interest in enforcing its drug laws against religious users of peyote. Oregon has never sought to prosecute re-
spondents, and does not claim that it has made significant enforcement efforts against other religious users of 
peyote.”). 
 346. See id. at 911-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The State proclaims an interest in protecting the health and 
safety of its citizens from the dangers of unlawful drugs. It offers, however, no evidence that the religious use of 
peyote has ever harmed anyone.”). 
 347. Cf. id. at 888 (“[I]f ‘compelling interest’ really means what it says (and watering it down here would 
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test.”). 
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nonetheless being no less deferential to state practices burdening free exercise.348 Instead 
of questioning which practices were religious or magnifying the alleged harms of the prac-
tice at issue, the Court instead modified the conditions under which state practices burden-
ing349 but not targeting religious practices would trigger strict scrutiny.350 
III. WHAT IS RELIGION FOR FREE EXERCISE PURPOSES 
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that religion for free exercise pur-
poses is to be construed rather broadly. While repeatedly insisting that free exercise guar-
antees are only triggered by religious (as opposed to non-religious) practices,351 the Court 
has not explained how to distinguish between religion and non-religion.352 There are var-
ious ways to understand the Court’s approach, although a synthesis of several of the points 
made in the case law makes clear the direction that should be taken when outlining the 
prevailing approach. 
A.  Why Define Religion 
Some commentators suggest that there is no need to define religion for free exercise 
purposes—instead, we should look at the commonalities among paradigmatic religions, 
which will provide all that is needed.353 Certainly, we would expect paradigmatic religious 
practices to be included within those beliefs and practices potentially triggering free exer-
cise protections, and focusing on paradigmatic beliefs and practices might provide a useful 
guide in some respects.354 Nonetheless, such an approach has its drawbacks, if only be-
cause it assumes agreement about which sets of beliefs are paradigmatically religious.355 
If that assumption is not warranted,356 then the approach will lose much of its usefulness 
                                                          
 348. Cf. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (“The government’s ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of 
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring 
the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.’”) (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian 
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)). 
 349. See id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“To reach this sweeping result, however, the 
Court must not only give a strained reading of the First Amendment but must also disregard our consistent ap-
plication of free exercise doctrine to cases involving generally applicable regulations that burden religious con-
duct.”). 
 350. The Court will use strict scrutiny if a statute specifically targets religious practice. See Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 351. See Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 522 (2012) 
(“[T]he Court affirmed that religion is ‘special’ in Thomas v. Review Board.”). 
 352. Ethridge B. Ricks, The Gospel According to the Warden: RLUIPA, the First Amendment, and Prisoners’ 
Religious Liberty Requests, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 542, 548 (2013) (noting “the lack of a functional definition 
of religion”). 
 353. See Freeman, supra note 275, at 1565 (“There simply is no essence of religion, no single feature or set of 
features that all religions have in common and this distinguishes religion form everything else. There is only a 
focus, coupled with a set of paradigmatic features. These, without more, however, are enough.”). 
 354. Cf. supra note 257 and accompanying text (discussing some aspects of Amish beliefs making them suit-
able for protection). 
 355. Some commentators suggest that religion imposes certain requirements on individuals. See Chad Flan-
ders, The Possibility of a Secular First Amendment, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 257, 289 (2008) (“religion requires 
obedience to a higher authority; in other words, religion shows believers (and people in general) that they are 
accountable to a non-temporal judge, and that there may be extra-temporal consequences to their actions”). How-
ever, such a view would doubtless be quite controversial depending upon how the criteria for the non-temporal 
judge were spelled out. 
 356. See Mason Blake Binkley, A Loss for Words: “Religion” in the First Amendment, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. 
REV. 185, 210 (2010) (“[T]he approach unrealistically presupposes broad agreement on a set of paradigmatic 
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and may in effect give judges free rein to decide whether a particular set of beliefs qualifies 
as religious.357 
Suppose that there were agreement about which beliefs or features were paradigmat-
ically religious.358 Even so, that might be much less helpful than might originally be 
thought, because religion for free exercise purposes might be much broader than the defi-
nition of religion for other purposes. As the Welsh Court noted, the conventional sense of 
religion did not correspond to the definition of religion that Congress had been using in its 
conscientious objector legislation,359 and the same point might be made about religion for 
free exercise purposes.360 
B.  The Breadth of What Counts as Religion 
The Court’s apparent willingness to construe religion broadly for free exercise pur-
poses implies that judges should give the benefit of the doubt to assertions that particular 
beliefs are religious.361 Yet, telling judges that they must give the benefit of the doubt to 
such assertions will not provide sufficient guidance unless much more is said about the 
kinds of beliefs that might qualify. 
While the current jurisprudence countenances a much broader definition of religion 
than it once did,362 the Court nonetheless believes that what counts as religion for free 
exercise purposes is not unlimited. Religion is expressly afforded special treatment in the 
First Amendment363 and the protections contained therein would seem to do little work if 
religion could not be differentiated from non-religion.364 The Court has explained that the 
beliefs in question must not merely be “philosophical,”365 although the Court has not 
spelled out how to distinguish the philosophical from the non-philosophical. 
                                                          
features of religion.”). 
 357. Eduardo Penalver, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 816 (1997) (“The . . . definitions by 
analogy . . . would do nothing to constrain the decisionmaking processes of individual judges. They would leave 
each judge completely free to determine whether or not a belief system is a religion according to the presence or 
absence of any single characteristic (or combination of characteristics) the judge chooses.”). 
 358. For a proposed criterion, see Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 
CUMB. L. REV. 1, 33 (1992) (“Religious beliefs are non-rational; they cannot be proven or demonstrated by their 
adherents because they are not based upon reason, but are based upon what might be referred to as intuition or 
faith.”). 
 359. See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 360. See discussion supra notes 184-85 for a more inclusive definition of religion for free exercise purposes. 
 361. Binkley, supra note 356, at 221 (“[I]n borderline free exercise cases, these principles suggest that the 
court should probably err on the side of a finding that the belief system or way of life at issue (i.e., the disputed 
instance) qualifies as a religion”). 
 362. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1425 (1990) (“The term ‘free exercise’ first appeared in an American legal document in 
1648, when Lord Baltimore required his new Protestant governor and councilors in Maryland to promise not to 
disturb Christians (‘and in particular no Roman Catholic’) in the ‘free exercise’ of their religion.”); Mark C. 
Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope: Justice Blackmun and the Freedom of Religion, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 30 
(1998) (“This ‘Christian,’ or perhaps one might say ‘Eurocentric,’ cast to the Court’s free exercise jurisprudence 
was once overt.”). 
 363. Flanders, supra note 355, at 259 (“[T]he text of the Constitution proclaims that religion is to be “singled 
out” in respect to both its exercise and whether the state can establish a religion.”). 
 364. Kolenc, supra note 254, at 418 (“[I]f religion can no longer be distinguished from nonreligion, then the 
Religion Clauses would seem to protect nothing special.”). 
 365. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). 
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Some commentators suggest that the Court’s exclusion of the philosophical indicates 
that religious beliefs must be based on faith366 rather than reason,367 although that would 
seem to reject Catholicism as a religion368 and would seem to limit philosophy too se-
verely as well.369 Further, such an explanation does not capture the tone of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. For example, the Thomas Court explained that beliefs do not need to be 
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to qualify as religious.370 Yet, in suggesting that, 
the Court was not implying that religious beliefs could not be based on reason. 
The Yoder Court’s reference to philosophy may well have involved an attempt to 
capture the Seeger Court’s exclusion of views that were “essentially political, sociological, 
or philosophical.”371 Perhaps the Court was attempting to limit religious beliefs by offer-
ing a negative definition and specifying which beliefs do not qualify. But that explanation 
is not plausible if only because the Court likely did not have particular contents in mind 
when referring to philosophy. For example, the Court often talks about a particular “eco-
nomic philosophy,”372 which seems to use “philosophy” to stand for a “set of beliefs” 
without a further specification of content. Further, the Seeger discussion of “Hindu phi-
losophy, [where] the Supreme Being is the transcendental reality which is truth, knowledge 
and bliss”373 was meant to include rather than exclude religious beliefs. By the same token, 
                                                          
 366. Austin, supra note 358, at 33 (“Religious beliefs are non-rational; they cannot be proven or demonstrated 
by their adherents because they are not based upon reason, but are based upon what might be referred to as 
intuition or faith.”). 
 367. Id. at 34 (“In Yoder, the Court stated that purely philosophical systems cannot enjoy the protection (and 
presumably do not have to bear the burdens) of the religion clauses. Apparently, the Court was suggesting a 
rational/non-rational distinction.”). 
 368. Cf. Book Note, Religion and Roe: The Politics of Exclusion, 108 HARV. L. REV. 495, 496 (1994) (review-
ing ELIZABETH MENSCH AND ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993)) 
(“Catholicism’s natural law tradition emphasizes an ‘objective natural order’ revealed to our ‘careful human 
reason.’”). 
 369. See Ellis Washington, Reply to Judge Richard A. Posner on the Inseparability of Law and Morality, 3 
RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1 (2001) (discussing “the philosophy of emotivism”). 
 370. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
 371. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) 
 372. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful 
Arts.’”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2003) (quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219); Golan v. Holder, 132 
S. Ct. 873, 899 (2012) (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212 n.18); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) 
(discussing a “particular economic or social philosophy”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 495 n.3 
(2001) (citing Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 519 (1969) 
(citing Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 729) (“There was a time when the Due Process Clause was used by this Court to 
strike down laws which were thought unreasonable, that is, unwise or incompatible with some particular eco-
nomic or social philosophy.”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., concurring) (discussing 
“the evanescent standards of the majority’s philosophy have been used to nullity state legislative programs passed 
to suppress evil economic practices”); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968) (discussing “whether govern-
ment can probe the reading habits, political philosophy, beliefs, and attitudes on social and economic issues of 
prospective seamen on our merchant vessels”); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) 
(“[I]in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction making the 
difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as 
whether prices are reasonable-a determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of 
our economic organization and a choice between rival philosophies.”); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 
462-64 (1927) (quoting Trenton Potteries Co.); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (discussing an attempt “to impose a particular economic philosophy upon the 
Constitution”). 
 373. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 174-75 (emphasis added). 
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the Seeger Court cited to various philosophical works upon which Seeger’s protected be-
lief system was based.374 Thus, philosophical works may be treated as secular rather than 
religious, but also may be treated as religious rather than secular. Further, “philosophy” is 
sometimes used as a synonym for “set of beliefs” or “approach,” suggesting that certain 
approaches (but not others) are secular without a clear exposition of which are which. A 
possible way to understand which philosophies are secular and which religious involves 
the difference between what it viewed as descriptive and what it viewed as normative or 
aspirational—the Welsh Court suggested that “ deeply held moral, ethical, or religious 
beliefs”375 are all protected. 
Some commentators suggest that the proper way to understand the content protected 
by free exercise guarantees is that “any concern deemed ultimate [must] be protected.”376 
But such a standard requires someone, e.g., the believer herself377 or a court,378 to decide 
whether the beliefs at issue are sufficiently important to meet that standard. But permitting 
a court to decide whether a belief is sufficiently important would seem no more appropriate 
than having a court decide which religious beliefs are true.379 Further, such a standard 
would be both too narrow and too broad—purely secular beliefs might be matters of ulti-
mate concern and thus protected,380 and paradigmatic religious beliefs might not be 
viewed as sufficiently important by the believer herself to qualify.381 
                                                          
 374. Id. at 166 (noting that Seeger “cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his 
ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity ‘without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.’”); see also 
Donald L. Beschle, Does a Broad Free Exercise Right Require a Narrow Definition of “Religion”?, 39 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 368 (2012) (“Seeger rested his pacifism on his readings of philosophers such as 
Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza.”). 
 375. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). 
 376. See Note, Toward A Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1075-76 (1978); see 
also Michael Rhea, Denying and Defining Religion under the First Amendment: Waldorf Education as a Lens 
for Advocating a Broad Definitional Approach, 72 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (2012) (“[T]he test does not ex-
amine the content of the belief at issue but instead aims to determine whether a belief is subjectively identifiable 
in the eyes of an adherent as an ultimate, gravely significant concern.”). 
 377. See Note, supra note 376, at 1076 (“[I]mplicit in this approach is recognition that the only actor competent 
to decide what constitutes an ultimate concern is the individual believer.”). 
 378. Terry L. Slye, Rendering Unto Caesar: Defining “Religion’ for Purposes of Administering Religion-
Based Tax Exemptions, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 219, 230 (1983) (“Ultimately, the courts must determine 
whether . . .  [the] beliefs . . . [are] deeply and sincerely held . . . [and whether they] involve a matter of ultimate 
concern.”). 
 379. Cf. Adam J. MacLeod, Resurrecting the Bogeyman: The Curious Forms of the Substantial Burden Test 
in RLUIPA, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 115, 130 (2011) (suggesting that it is inappropriate for courts to be making certain 
judgments about religious beliefs). 
 380. Austin, supra note 358, at 28 (“[I]t appears strange to assert that the devotion one pays to a particular 
belief determines whether or not it is religious. Such a definition results in merely self-interested individuals 
being considered religious, and intensely dedicated Democrats or Republicans being considered religious.”). 
 381. Jeffrey L. Oldham, Constitutional “Religion”: A Survey of First Amendment Definitions of Religion, 6 
TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 156 (2001) (“[S]ince the definition appears to qualify beliefs as religious based on 
the strength of convictions—in other words, concerns must be ‘ultimate’—then it is possible that a believer from 
an established church who cannot pinpoint a particular ultimate concern, or even someone whose clearly religious 
beliefs inherently are not geared to make them zealots, can be excluded from First Amendment protection.”); 
Timothy L. Hall, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 
156 (1982) (“Since it defines religion in terms of the intensity of an individual’s commitment, individuals prac-
ticing even traditional religious faiths for whom that faith is not an ‘ultimate concern’ would fall outside the 
protection of the free exercise clause.”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion 
Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including Theology, 
Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123, 159 (2007) (“Proponents of narrowing 
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Nor does the ultimate concern approach capture the Court’s jurisprudence—the def-
inition of religion adopted for free exercise purposes has not excluded what would nor-
mally be thought of as religious beliefs even where there has been no showing that the 
believer viewed the beliefs as implicating matters of ultimate concern. A more plausible 
interpretation of the jurisprudence is that whatever degree of commitment is represented 
by a variety of believers is the requisite level of commitment, although that means that 
beliefs would not have to be of ultimate or even great concern to qualify—instead, a 
“meaningful belief”382 suffices. 
C.  Sincerity 
The Court has repeatedly affirmed that states are permitted to judge the sincerity of 
belief.383 However, at least two points might be made about such a criterion. The sincerity 
that must be shown is simply that the individual holds the belief. Beliefs do not have to 
form a consistent and coherent creed in order to be considered religious and protected. As 
the Thomas Court explained: “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, 
or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”384 
Further, it is important to prevent the trier of fact from imputing insincerity because 
the underlying belief does not seem credible.385 While the Court has suggested that “bi-
zarre”386 beliefs may not “be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause,”387 
the degree to which beliefs must be bizarre in order to be unprotected is rather high, as is 
illustrated by the protection accorded to the beliefs at issue in Ballard.388 
One issue is whether an individual sincerely believes something; another is why she 
believes it. The Court has suggested that some beliefs are “so clearly nonreligious in mo-
tivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”389 However, 
the mere presence of a compelling non-religious reason does not establish that the individ-
ual’s motivation is in fact nonreligious. 
Consider the conscientious objector cases.390 The motivations of the individuals 
claiming that status were accepted as sincerely religious, even though there was a very 
compelling non-religious reason (survival) that no doubt might have motivated others to 
                                                          
the definition concede that this concept may offend some who regard their practices as religious, but argue that 
to allow religion to be anything one asserts it to be—i.e., any ultimate concern—will defeat any meaningful 
protection under the First Amendment.”); Austin, supra note 358, at 28 (“[I]it appears strange to assert that the 
devotion one pays to a particular belief determines whether or not it is religious. Such a definition results in 
merely self-interested individuals being considered religious, and intensely dedicated Democrats or Republicans 
being considered religious.”). 
 382. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965). 
 383. Garrett Epps, What We Talk About When We Talk About Free Exercise, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 563, 570 (1998) 
(“[O]ne concern that the Court has inherited from the Framers is the concern for false claimants-citizens who 
will opportunistically designate a seemingly secular practice as religious in order to obtain the state’s protection 
and thus an advantage over others who seek to do the same thing for non-religious reasons.”). 
 384. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
 385. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties the Ballard jury members 
might have faced). 
 386. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
 387. Id. 
 388. See supra notes 100-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ballard. 
 389. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715. 
 390. See discussion of Seeger, Welsh, and Gillette supra notes 198-254 and accompanying text. 
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seek that protected status. When affirming the denial of the requested conscientious objec-
tor status, the Gillette Court accepted that the challengers were sincere and that their claims 
were based on religious convictions,391 but believed that the state’s interests justified the 
refusal to grant the requested status.392 Those state interests included the difficulty in dis-
tinguishing between religious and nonreligious motivations among those objecting to par-
ticipating in a particular war.393 Thus, the Court recognized the difficulties in ascertaining 
why people hold their beliefs and that a particular belief might be held for religious rea-
sons, thus possibly triggering free exercise review, or for non-religious reasons and not 
triggering that review. Regrettably, the Court offered no special insights about how to 
identify an individual’s motivation for holding a particular belief. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court has offered some very broad parameters about what counts as religion. 
The views cannot be “purely secular,”394 which means that the views cannot be purely 
non-religious.395 However, that does not provide much of a limitation until it is clear what 
would count as purely secular, which is more difficult to determine than might be sup-
posed. For example, if secular humanism is considered a religion for free exercise pur-
poses,396 then it will be necessary to establish the respects in which secular humanism is 
not purely secular, e.g., by suggesting that it incorporates a particular set of moral values 
or beliefs about transcendent issues,397 or, perhaps, because there are certified counselors 
analogous to members of the clergy398 or weekly meetings.399 
                                                          
 391. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 447 (1971) (“[W]e hold . . . that persons who object solely to 
participation in a particular war are not within the purview of the exempting section, even though the latter 
objection may have such roots in a claimant’s conscience and personality that it is ‘religious’ in character.”). 
 392. See id. at 461 (“Nonetheless, our analysis of s 6(j) for Establishment Clause purposes has revealed gov-
ernmental interests of a kind and weight sufficient to justify under the Free Exercise Clause the impact of the 
conscription laws on those who object to particular wars.”). 
 393. See id. at 455-56 (“[O]ver the realm of possible situations, opposition to a particular war may more likely 
be political and nonconscientious, than otherwise . . . .The difficulties of sorting the two, with a sure hand, are 
considerable.”) (citing United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943)). 
 394. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). 
 395. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (discussing 
“the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other”). 
 396. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (“Among religions in this country which do not 
teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, 
Secular Humanism and others.”); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1534 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Sec-
ular humanism may be a religion.”). 
 397. See Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs of Mobile Cnty. 655 F. Supp. 939, 982 (S.D. Ala.), rev’d on other 
grounds, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (“A statement that there is no transcendent or supernatural reality is a 
religious statement. A statement that there is no scientific proof of supernatural or transcendent reality is irrele-
vant and nonsensical, because inquiry into the fundamental nature of man and reality itself may not be confined 
solely within the sphere of physical, tangible, observable science.”). 
 398. Id. at 970 (“The American Humanist Association certifies humanist counselors who enjoy the legal status 
of ordained priests, pastors, and rabbis.”). 
 399. See Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[A]n organization of Secular Humanists sought a 
tax exemption on the ground that they used their property ‘solely and exclusively for religious worship.’ Despite 
the group’s non-theistic beliefs, the court determined that the activities of the Fellowship of Humanity, which 
included weekly Sunday meetings, were analogous to the activities of theistic churches and thus entitled to an 
exemption.”) (citing Fellowship of Humanity v. Cty. of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394, 409 (Cal. App. 1957)). 
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The Yoder Court suggested that religious beliefs cannot simply be “subjective”400 
or “merely a matter of personal preference.”401 The Amish beliefs were protected because 
they were “of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately 
related to daily living.”402 But the Yoder Court was not thereby setting out the necessary 
conditions for triggering free exercise guarantees, as was made clear in Frazee almost two 
decades later.403 
The Frazee Court held that a “personal professed religious belief”404 qualified for 
free exercise protection. When again affirming that “[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause”405 and “[p]urely secular views” do not suffice,406 
the Frazee Court was not suggesting that purely personal views could not be entitled to 
protection—the Court expressly rejected that “one must be responding to the commands 
of a particular religious organization”407 to trigger free exercise guarantees. So, too, the 
Gillette Court explained that “while the objection must have roots in conscience and per-
sonality that are ‘religious’ in nature, this requirement has never been construed to elevate 
conventional piety or religiosity of any kind above the imperatives of a personal faith.”408 
When the Frazee Court stated that “States are clearly entitled to assure themselves 
that there is an ample predicate for invoking the Free Exercise Clause,”409 the Court pre-
sumably meant that states can consider the individual’s sincerity of belief, the importance 
of the belief to the individual so that it is not a mere personal preference, and the content 
of the belief to assure that it is not utterly bizarre. In addition, the State can assure itself 
that the beliefs involve some moral rather than merely descriptive elements and that the 
commitment to that normative view is not a mere preference but involves more “deeply 
held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs.”410 Nonetheless, religion for free exercise pur-
poses includes a whole host of beliefs that would not qualify as religious using a more 
conventional definition of that term. 
The definition of religion in free exercise jurisprudence will be both heartening and 
disheartening to individuals on each side of the Culture Wars. Religion is privileged over 
non-religion (which should cheer traditionalists), although that definition is broad enough 
to include a great variety of minority and nontraditional views (which should cheer non-
traditionalists). Courts can look at the content of religious beliefs when assessing whether 
beliefs and practices are protected. However, that assessment cannot involve a determina-
tion of truth or falsity, and is quite limited in the kinds of judgments that can be offered—
whether the belief is utterly bizarre or whether the belief is purely secular. 
Much of the jurisprudence attempts to steer courts away from the wrong path in a 
                                                          
 400. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972). 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. 
 403. Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security was decided in 1989. See 489 U.S 829 (1989), 
whereas Wisconsin v. Yoder was decided in 1972. See 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 404. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 831 (citing Frazee, 512 N.E.2d at 790). 
 405. Id. at 833 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). 
 406. Id. (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16). 
 407. Id. at 834. 
 408. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971). 
 409. Frazee, 489 U.S. at 833. 
 410. Id. at 344. 
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case involving free exercise—they are not to judge religious beliefs in terms of consistency 
or plausibility. As long as the beliefs are sincerely held, have some normative element, 
and do not seem to involve a mere personal preference, they are the kind of beliefs that 
can trigger free exercise guarantees. A separate question involves the strength of protec-
tions that free exercise guarantees afford, although any analysis of those protections must 
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